Western Washington University
Masthead Logo

Western CEDAR

History Faculty and Staff Publications

History

12-1975

Hermann Neubacher and Austrian Anschluss
Movement, 1918-40
Harry Ritter
Western Washington University, harry.ritter@wwu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/history_facpubs
Part of the European History Commons
Recommended Citation
Ritter, Harry, "Hermann Neubacher and Austrian Anschluss Movement, 1918-40" (1975). History Faculty and Staff Publications. 33.
https://cedar.wwu.edu/history_facpubs/33

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History at Western CEDAR. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Faculty and Staff
Publications by an authorized administrator of Western CEDAR. For more information, please contact westerncedar@wwu.edu.

Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical
Association

Hermann Neubacher and the Austrian Anschluss Movement, 1918-40
Author(s): Harry R. Ritter
Source: Central European History, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Dec., 1975), pp. 348-369
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Conference Group for Central European
History of the American Historical Association

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545754 .
Accessed: 29/10/2014 13:36

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

.

Cambridge University Press and Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical
Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Central European History.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Wed, 29 Oct 2014 13:36:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Hermann

and

Neubacher

Anschluss

Movement,
HARRY

THE

the

Austrian

1918-40

R. RITTER

Anschluss problem was one of the most vexing legacies of
nationalism and the peace settlement of 1919.
nineteenth-century
the Anschluss movement
Seen in broad perspective,
belongs to

a dream
the final chapter in the history ofthe idea ofGrossdeutschland,
ofthe most
born in 1848 and shared after 1867 by German-Austrians
and political opinions.
varied cultural backgrounds
Support for Ger?
the collapse ofthe Habsburg Monarchy
man union intensified following
in 1918, but was frustrated by the restrictions placed upon union by the
After 1919 sympathy for An?
treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain.1
schluss transcended party lines in the infant Austrian republic, and grew
rapidly than within Germany itself. For many members of the
"front generation,,,
young men who had served in the Habsburg army
of defeat with special intensity, the cause
and who felt the humiliation
more

force. Nowhere
became a life-shaping
trated than in the career of Hermann Neubacher.
of Anschluss

illus?

as a diplomat who served the Third Reich
War II,2 but he was also an important
and a
Austrian affairs. Energetic,
resourceful,
who
was an ambitious
Neubacher
provincial

is best known

Neubacher
in the Balkans

during
in interwar

participant
skillful public
fashioned

is this better

World

speaker,
a successful career in Vienna

during the 1920s. His outstand?
to cultivate and maintain connections

ing characteristic was the ability
for power in the first republic.
with most of the groups competing
to German unity
a
dedication
all
was
resolute
his
actions
Underlying
led him into activity as a political organizer
drew him into the Nazi movement:
and eventually
which

schluss in 1938 he was appointed

mayor

of Vienna.

and propagandist,
the An?
following
The Anschluss theme

1. Nikolaus von Preradovich, Der nationaleGedankein Osterreich1866-1938 (Gottingen,
1962), pp. 17, 30.
Sudost1940-1943:BerichteinesfliegendenDiplomaten,2d
2. See his memoir Sonderauftrag
ed. (Gottingen, 1957).
348
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his many activities and makes
of an "Anschluss man."

ties together
development
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349
his early life a study

in the

was the son ofa school director in the Upper
(1893-1960)
With the aid ofa government
of Gmunden.
stipend he
in
and
in
Kremsmunster
attended the Benedictine
1912 engymnasium
rolled in the Hochschule fur Bodenkultur in Vienna, where he studied forAustrian

town

the Akademischer
a nationalist
fraternity,
gymnastics
estry and joined
Turnverein. During the war he served in Italy, was cited four times for
bravery, and earned the rank of Oberleutnant. After the war he com?
pleted his studies, receiving the degree ofDoktor der Bodenkultur in 1920.3
the dictated peace settle?
Neubacher
Like most Austrians,
opposed
for the former Habsburg Slavs,
ment, which honored self-determination
and ItaHans, but denied it to the Germans. He soon became
Rumanians,
of Anschluss for Austria, a region which, he later
proponent
wrote, "we love as a Heimat, but never wanted as a state."4 Anschluss,
was a goal which all parties could support, a
he idealistically
believed,
the ideological
tensions dividing his homereconcile
cause which could
an ardent

that the tiny republic,
Like many others, he was also convinced
Danubian
of
its
former
hinterland,
simply could not survive
stripped
to
become
to
Austria
needed
endure,
economically;
part of a larger
was the conviction
that
these considerations
unit. Underlying
economic

land.

the "greater

German"

of the "logic of historical
idea was a product
of all Germans in one state was in-

and that the union

development,"
evitable.5 These beliefs became
devotion

to Anschluss

the foundation

for Neubacher's

steadfast

in the following
years.
Austrian independence,

Neubacher
was neutral
Although
neither attacking it nor strongly exerting himself
toward republicanism,
was a lost
in its defense. On one issue his position was clear: monarchism
to the
were subordinate
cause. Beyond
this, constitutional
questions
he opposed

His attitude toward politics?based
in his thinking.
that the true patriot stands above partisan quarrels?
did as much to
shared in interwar Austria and probably
on parliaattacks
as more dramatic,
free institutions
open

of union
problem
on the assumption
was widely
undermine
mentarianism

by extremists.

3. Private interview with Caroline Neubacher, Vienna, Aug. 20,1972; Caroline Neu?
bacher to the author, Vienna, Nov. 6, 1971; Die Presse (Vienna), July 3, 1960, p. 9.
4. Der Anschluss: Mitteilungen des Osterreichisch-DeutschenVolksbundes(Vienna), Sept.
21, 1929, p. 2.
5. Ibid., Nov. 15, 1927, p. 1.
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In 1920 Neubacher
met two men who were to play important roles
in Austrian politics. In that year he married the daughter of Wilhelm
Loschnig, a minor Lower Austrian official and member ofthe Christian
Social Party. Through his wife's family, Neubacher met the future Aus?
trian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, who was a former student and close
friend of Herr Loschnig. In the following
years Dollfuss was a frequent
in
Neubacher
the
household
and
the two men became close
guest
acquaintances,
to differences

although

never

genuine friends.6
the church. Dollfuss,

regarding
the priesthood,
championed
political Catholicism,
shared the anticlericalism
while not doctrinaire,
manism.

This was due, in part,
trained originally
for
whereas
of prewar

Neubacher,
Pan-Ger-

more important acquaintance
was Arthur Seyss-Inquart,
a
from
the
former
of
Moravia.
attorney
Habsburg province
By
and Seyss-Inquart
the Neubacher
families found rooms in the

A second,
young
chance

same house in suburban
fact that both

Vienna

men had served

between
developed
and children often

soon after the war. From this, and the
in Italy, a lifelong friendship

as officers

the two families.

Between

1920 and 1938 the wives
As for the men,
holidays together.
quite different, seemed to complement

spent summer

their temperaments,
although
had an outgoing personality and was a persuaone another: Neubacher
sive speaker and conversationalist;
was quiet, cautious,
Seyss-Inquart
in
his
with
others.
and reserved
Both shared the conviction
that
dealings
and Germany should unite.7
after the war Neubacher,
Dollfuss, and Seyss-Inquart joined a
secret nationalist fraternity called the Deutsche Gemeinschaft. The history
Austria

Soon

is still obscure, but it
of this organization
of prominent
men, among them
the university
professors Othmar Spann
of
Vienna, Cardinal Piffl. The
archbishop
number

is known

to have included

a

Field Marshal
and Alfons

Karl Bardolff,
and the
Dopsch,

an
goals ofthe organization,
anti-Semitism
and the "red scare" of
ephemeral product of middle-class
the early twenties, included the cultivation
of "folk consciousness,"
the
of
for
Marxism
and
and
conquest
Ungeradetum (a euphemism
Jewry),
Anschluss. As fear of communism
diminished and economic
conditions
the organization
declined and finally died in 1930. Both
and
Dollfuss
Seyss-Inquart
played leading roles in the Deutsche Gemein-

improved,

6. Private interview with Caroline Neubacher, Vienna, Aug. 20, 1972.
7. Ibid.; Caroline Neubacher to the author, Vienna, Nov. 6, 1971; Wolfgang Rosar,
Deutsche Gemeinschaft:Seyss-Inquartund der Anschluss (Vienna, 1971), p. 20.
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but Neubacher
was not an active
schaft during the middle twenties,
a link with fellow veterans and a place to
member.
The club provided
discuss the problem of German unity, but Neubacher
soon became skeptical of achieving
Anschluss via conspiratorial
tactics and conceived
a
more ambitious plan: the creation ofa nonpartisan
Anschluss organiza?
tion which embraced all the major parties, including
Social Democracy,
a sworn

enemy of the Deutsche Gemeinschaft.8
Austrian Social Democracy
had emerged from
to the idea of union

mitted
social

revolution

tional

with

Germany,

in central

Europe. Unable
its leaders nevertheless

government,
of Vienna,
municipality
social

albeit

the war firmly com?
in the interests of a

to form
controlled

an enduring
until 1934

na?
the

where they sponsored
a model program
of
and public housing.
It was this program which attracted
to the Socialist camp in 1921, when he took a position with

reform

Neubacher

the Gemeinschaftliche Siedlungsund Baustoffanstalt (Gesiba),acorporation
formed by the city government
to finance and supply its housing project.9
The president
of Gesiba was Julius Deutsch,
the man who in 1923
would

found the Socialist

force, the Republikanischer
paramilitary
Neubacher
rapidly won fame as an expert

Schutz-

hund. Under Deutsch,
in pub?
lic finance, mainly by virtue of his successful reorganization
ofa number
of unprofitable
construction-materials
which were absorbed
companies
In
Gesiba.
he
was
director
of Gesiba, a post
1924
by
general
appointed
which he held until the firm was reorganized
by the Schuschnigg
gov?
ernment in 1934.10 His association with Gesiba brought Neubacher
into
a close working
with
the
leaders
of
Austrian
Marxism
and
relationship
he cultivated friendships with some of them, including Deutsch and the
economist
Hugo Breitner. This, along with frequent visits to the Soviet
in the 1920s as a commercial
ofthe
representative
won
him
the
ofa
"fellow
traveler"
ernment,
reputation
Union

servative

and nationalist

circles. Actually,

despite

Vienna
in some

close personal

gov?
con?

and pro-

8. Rosar, Deutsche Gemeinschaft, pp. 29-37, 47; Gordon Brook-Shepherd, Dollfuss
(London, 1961), pp. 28-29.
9. Osterreichisch-Deutscher Volksbund in Wien, "Anschlusspolitik 1925-1938: Zeitungsausschnittssammlung," 120 vols. (hereafter ZAS), vol. 118: Wiener Handelsblatt,
Oct. 5, 1926. This collection of newspaper clippings, now in the Wiener Stadtbibliotek,
was begun in 1925 immediately after Neubacher founded the Austro-German People's
League (see below) and contains items from Austrian and foreign newspapers relating to
the theme of Anschluss. In most cases page numbers are missing.
10. Julius Deutsch, Ein Weiter Weg: Lebenserinnerungen(Vienna, 1960), pp. 157-58;
ZAS, vol. 118: Wiener Handelsblatt,Oct. 5, 1926.

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Wed, 29 Oct 2014 13:36:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

352

Neubacher

and the Austrian

Anschluss

Movement

fessional

ties with Social Democracy
and a genuine commitment
to
was not sympathetic
toward Marxism;
he
reform, Neubacher
was, rather, a municipal socialist in the tradition of Vienna's turn-of-theEbcentury mayor, Karl Lueger, with an added interest in introducing
social

enezer Howard's

"garden city" idea of urban reform to Austria.11 None
his position in the city government,
for he
however,
as a talented administrator
who could help Social De?

of this undermined

was recognized
mocracy realize its plans for Vienna. Thus, Neubacher was able to combine middle-class
nationalism
and a cordial association with socialism,
a fact

of immeasurable

importance

for his activity

as an Anschluss

propagandist.
In 1925 Neubacher
of two
played a leading role in the formation
in
related
Anschluss
the
Austro-German
Vienna,
closely
organizations
Action Society (Osterreichisch-Deutscher Arbeitsgemeinschaft) and the Aus?
tro-German

Volksbund). Both
People's League (Osterreichisch-Deutscher
as
offshoots
a Berlin organi?
ofthe
Deutsch-Osterreicher
Volksbund,
began
zation led by Paul Lobe, the Social Democratic
president ofthe German
Reichstag. Lobe's group had originally been established in late 1918 to
union on the basis of national self-determina?
lobby for Austro-German
tion. It never attained real numerical power, however,
and did not seek
to extend its influence to Austria until 1925, when Lobe gave his blessand other Viennese organizers.12
ing to Neubacher
Ofthe

two Viennese

groups
May 3,1925. It was composed
specialists (420 in 1930) who

the Action

Society was founded first, on
ofa relatively small group of concerned
their opinions on legal, eco?
published

related to Anschluss in a journal called
nomic, and cultural problems
Deutsche Einheit. Neubacher
was a founding
member and, along with

il. According to Neubacher's understanding, Marxism fostered class struggle and
therefore contradicted the "fundamental truth" that "a nation is a special kind of organism, indivisible, necessarily dependent on all its parts." See Archiv der Stadt Wien, H. A.
Akten, Burgermeister, NS-Zeit (Neubacher, Blaschke 1938-1944, Aussprachen), Schachtel 1-18, Mappe 35 (hereafter ASW, Neubacher-Blaschke), no. 38, Nov. 26, 1938.
12. Osterreich-Deutschland(Berlin) 2, no. 3 (Mar. 1925): 21; Hermann Neubacher,
"Die Organisationen fiir den osterreichisch-deutschen Zusammenschluss," in Friedrich
F. G. Kleinwaechter and Heinz von Paller, eds., Die Anschlussfragein ihrer kulturellen,
politischenund wirtschaftlichen
Bedeutung(Vienna, 1930), pp. 605-17; Mary Margaret Ball,
Post-War GermanAustrianRelations: The AnschlussMovement,1918-1936 (Stanford, CaL,
!937); Stanley Suval, The AnschlussQuestionin the WeimarEra: A Study of Nationalismin
GermanyandAustria (Baltimore, Md., 1974), pp. 30-41. Suval estimates the peak enrollment of Lobe's organization at about 21,000.
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Gustav Stolper and Benedikt
Kautsky
(the son of Karl
of
draft
the
outlines
its
he
Kautsky),
helped
program.13
than the AustroThe Action Society, however,
was less important
the economist

as a
People's League, founded on June 4, 1925, and conceived
mass
which
did
"not
discriminate
between
organization"
"nonpartisan

German

or religion,
friends and ene?
only between
ideology,
party affiliation,
was the architect ofthe People's League
mies o? Anschluss."14 Neubacher
an office he held until 1935. His program,
and became its president,
modeled

on that of the older

ment the work
organizing
and persuade

ofthe

one million

Berlin

group,

smaller, academically
members he hoped

the League of Nations
union.15

was designed
oriented Action

to comple-

Society: by
world opinion
a plebiscite on the ques?

to influence

to sanction

tion of German
For a decade,

Neubacher's

name

was virtually

with the
synonymous
and
the
chief
organizer
speaker
which were its primary means of

He was its most active

People's League.
of numerous
public
influencing
opinion.
review
called
press

demonstrations,
In addition, he edited

a monthly

(later bimonthly)
Der Anschluss, which appeared between
1927 and
had
a
of
and
circulation
thousand.
The
national
about
1933
eight
peak
in
his
ofthe
was
even
located
Gesiba
office
People's League
headquarters
on the Wahringerstrasse
in Vienna. As a respected public figure with
in all the ideological
was able to fashion
connections
camps, Neubacher
the People's League into a meeting ground of sorts for Austria's warring
included representatives
of all parties ex?
factions; its original executive
and the Nazis. Among
the names that stand out
cept the Communists
of
the
Vienna
Paul Speiser and Bene?
are
those
councilman
city
today
professors Han Eibl (Chris?
(Grossdeutsch), Ernst Molden, an editor
of the liberal Neue Freie Presse, and Gustav Stolper, whose journal Der
osterreichische Volkswirt was one of the most influential
voices for Andikt Kautsky (Social Democrats),
tian Social) and Wilhelm
Bauer

university

13. "Das osterreichische Wirtschaftsproblem: Denkschrift der osterreichisch-deutschen
Arbeitsgemeinschaft," Der osterreichischeVolkswirt (Vienna) 17, no. 42 (July 18, 1925):
1153-60; Toni Stolper, Ein Leben in BrennpunktenunsererZeit: Gustav Stolper, 1888-1947
(Tubingen, 1960), p. 167.
14. Der Anschluss, Sept. 21, 1929, p. 2.
15. Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), June 5, 1925 (morning ed.), pp. 4-5; International
Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the InternationalMilitary Tribunal, 42 vols. (Nuremberg, 1947-49) (hereafter IMT), 11: 433-35; OsterreichischDeutscher Volksbund/Wien, Warumfordernwir denAnschluss? (Vienna, 1926); Paul Lobe
and Dr. Ing. Neubacher, Die osterreichisch-deutsche
Anschlussbewegung(Wurzen, Ger?
many, 1926).
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schluss. Neubacher's

friend

Movement

Anschluss

Seyss-Inquart

was

treasurer

of the orga?

nization.16
for the loosely structured People's League was, however,
distributed among the ideological
unevenly
camps. Its strongest pillar,
at least prior to 1933, was Viennese
Until Hitler
Social Democracy.
Support

in Germany,
the Socialist Party and its affiliated trade
actively supported Anschluss, and the People's League enjoyed
their official endorsement.
Many leading Socialists spoke and wrote in
behalf ofthe organization,
among them Deutsch, Breitner, Otto Bauer,
came

to power

unions

contributed
Vienna's Socialist government
Moreover,
work.17 At
to
its
thousand
often
schillings
average
support
that the
Socialist influence was so conspicuous
demonstrations

and Karl Renner.
an annual

early
anti-Marxist
zation

press more than once erroneously
as a front for "bolshevism."18

denounced

the organi?

were
Socialist movement
Less important
than the large, disciplined
nationalist parties such as the Grossdeutsche Volkspartei and the Landbund.
had close ties with these groups through nationalist societies
such as the Deutsche Klub, the gymnastics
fraternities, and the Deutsche
he was most at home in the nationalist
Gemeinschaft. By inclination
Neubacher

anti-Semitism,
camp, although he did not share the rigid anti-Marxism,
or Los von Rom fanaticism associated with its extremist wing. Many
roles in the People's League but, in
nationalist leaders played prominent
to
the long run, the nationalist parties were too weak and fragmented
contribute
financial

significantly
terms.

to the organization,

either

in numerical

or in

Social Party was divided on the issue of union with
for the People's League, the least important
of the
and
was,
Germany
who
Those
Christian
Socials
supported Anschluss, par?
political groups.
identified themselves with Neuticularly the academics, enthusiastically
The Christian

bacher's efforts, but influential traditionalists within the party feared the
of merger with the predominantly
Protestant and heavily
consequences
socialist German Republic. This faction broadcast its views in the Reichs16. Osterreichisch-Deutscher Volksbund in Wien, Was will derOsterreichisch-Deutscher
Volksbund?(Vienna, 1926).
17. N. von Preradovich, Die Wilhelmstrasseund AnschlussOsterreichs1918-1933 (Bern,
1971), P- 183.
18. The Christian Social Reichspost,for example, reported the presence of uniformed
Schutzbundmembers at ceremonies honoring a visit by Paul Lobe to Vienna in 1925, and
wondered if, by "Anschluss," the People's League meant union with Germany or Soviet
Russia. ZAS, vol. 1: Reichspost(Vienna), Aug. 30 and 31, 1925.
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the party?Seipel
and later Dollfuss?were
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severe

critics.

ambivalent

The leaders
about

of

Anschluss

and reserved

toward the People's League; Seipel, in a now well known
of 1928, privately
confided
that while he supported
Anschluss in
he
Neubacher
was
Thus,
principle,
opposed
"premature
agitation."19
unable to win the official endorsement
of Christian
and,
Socialism;
letter

since the clericals were the dominant
to obtain

the financial

party in interwar Austria, his efforts
of the government
went unrewarded.

backing
was partially offset by secret contributions
from Ger?
Between
and
both
the
and
the
Action
1925
1932
many.
People's League
Society received, usually via Lobe, substantial assistance from the Ger?
man ministries of interior and foreign affairs. The Reich ministry of in?
This weakness

for example,
allocated some
for
ple's League
"Deutschtumspflege"
however,
cally curtailed in 1931-32,
central Europe.20
terior,

fifteen

thousand

marks

to the Peo?

in 1930. These funds were drastiwhen the world depression struck

The tactical philosophy
ofthe People's League was borrowed
directly
from Lobe and based on the premise that the League of Nations Council
could be persuaded
to rectify the injustices
of the peace settlement.
When

queried in 1929 regarding the use of force as a possible means of
the problem
of union, Neubacher
to
affirmed his opposition
resolving
direct action, arguing that violence would only tarnish Austria's image
to
he maintained,
was a resolute dedication
abroad; the best solution,

Anschluss

the
channels.21 Throughout
diplomacy
through international
he
Neu?
continued
to
of
Yet
force as self-defeating.
1930s
oppose the use
bacher embodied
within himself much ofthe ambivalence
characteris?
tic of interwar

on Anschluss reveal a
Austria, and his pronouncements
in his approach to the problem.
On the one
contradiction
hand, he appealed to reason, depicting German union as part of an irresistible global trend toward larger, more efficient geopolitical
units. On
fundamental

19- Paul R. Sweet, "Seipel's Views on Anschlussin 1928: An Unpublished Exchange of
Letters," Journal of Modern History 19, no. 4 (Dec. 1947): 320-23. See also Suval, The
Anschluss Question, pp. 37, 44-45; and Klemens von Klemperer, Ignaz Seipel: Christian
Statesmanin a Time of Crisis (Princeton, N.J., 1972), pp. 112-17, 301-6. To my knowl?
edge there is no adequate study of Dollfuss's relationship to the Anschluss movement.
See Rosar, Deutsche Gemeinschaft,pp. 32-37.
20. Preradovich, Die Wilhelmstrasse,pp. 180-89; U.S. National Archives (hereafter
NA), unsigned report to Wirth, Nov. 20, 1930, Microcopy T-120 (German Foreign
Office), roll 2492, frames E266802-3 (hereafter T-120/2492/E266802-3); ibid., Lerchen?
feld to Dr. Emminger, Dec. 2, 1930, T-120/2492/E266842-43.
21. Der Anschluss, Sept. 21, 1929, p. 2.
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occasion, he even argued that Anschluss could serve as a model for other
states to follow toward the goal of European unity. As a propagandist,
however, his real effectiveness lay in the emotional appeal of his speeches
of French and
and editorials, which were replete with denunciations
and stressed that Anschluss was the necessary product
Czech diplomacy
unique history which bound Austria and Germany in a "commu?
nity of destiny."22 Thus, despite his essentially moderate approach to
rhetoric always
the Anschluss question, it cannot be said that Neubacher's
ofa

nourished
Between

a spirit of patience and conciliation
among his followers.
1925 and 1933 the People's League staged numerous demonthe largest and most successful of which occurred in conjunc-

strations,
tion with the Schubert

a festival held in Vienna in July 1928
Centennial,
of the composer's
death.
the hundredth
to commemorate
anniversary
for
The Schubert festival was one ofthe most important demonstrations

in the 1920s, attracting singers, musicians,
from throughout
Europe, and from abroad. Capitalizing
German

unity

and travelers
on the enthu?

siasm aroused by the festival, the People's League organized demonstra?
and founded
tions not only in Vienna, but in Styria and the Burgenland,
and
Eisenstadt.23
in
Graz
chapters
a period of rapid growth for
The Schubert Centennial
inaugurated
the People's League, and by April 1929 it had achieved its goal of one mil?
lion members. This included the Viennese parent chapter and branches
in Linz, Graz, Eisenstadt, Salzburg, and Klagenfurt,
important because
they reflected support for Anschluss outside of "red" Vienna. The organ?
ization attained its peak strength in 1930, when it claimed to speak for
of the electorate.24
and to represent two-thirds
inflated due to Neubacher's
These figures, undoubtedly
practice of ensocial
entire
unions,
clubs,
organizations?trade
professional so?
rolling
for
a
of
less than seven
nonetheless
etc.?are
cieties,
country
impressive
million inhabitants.25
1.8 million

Austrians

optimistically
interpreted the growth of
Writing in 1930, Neubacher
as a sign of "successful settlement
of the [Anschluss]
his organization
and "hard-won
issue within greater Germany"
abroad of
recognition
of
the urgency of European economic
which
Austro-Gerintegration,
22. Ibid., Aug. 15, 1928, p. 2; Neue Freie Presse,July 20, 1928 (morning ed.), p. 6.
23. Der Anschluss,Nov. 12, 1928, p. 1; Dec. 15, 1928, p. 1; Jan. 26, 1929, p. 1.
24. Der Anschluss,Apr. 27, 1929, p. 1; Nov. 29, 1930, p. 1.
25. Preradovich, Der nationale Gedanke,p. 21; cf. Suval, The AnschlussQuestion, pp.
43-44-
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must gradually emerge as the natural starting point."26 This
while not inaccurate regarding the situation in Austria and
observation,
and misinterpreted
the impact of An?
Germany,
seriously exaggerated
schluss propaganda
abroad. For, although
a few foreign scholars knew
man union

of the People's League and understood
its motives,
its activities were
in the foreign press. This
neither closely nor sympathetically
is reflected in the large file of newspaper
assembled
by the
clippings
from
and
which
consists
of
items
the
Austrian
organization,
mainly
followed

German

press. Although
clippings from French and east European news?
are
hostile. The Italian press is
numerous,
they are generally
papers
of clippings
and the paucity
from English and
sparsely represented,
American newspapers
testifies to the meager and partially negative im?
pact of Anschluss propaganda
of the People's
importance
achievement

on Anglo-American
The real
opinion.27
League, it would
appear, lies less in the
revision
of
goal?the
foreign opinion?than

of its primary
in the fact that it helped prepare Austria for an overly optimistic
reception ofthe customs union proposals of 1931.
The creation of an Austro-German
customs union, one of Neubacher's

was widely
discussed in the 1920s as an alternative
to
key demands,
French proposals for a "Danubian
federation"
of Habsburg
succession
on the
states, and in 1930 Vienna and Berlin secretly began negotiations
intensified his
noticeably
the
support
possible legal restric?
of 1922, which required Austria to
tions?such
as the Geneva Protocols
which might compromise
avoid economic
its independence
agreements
maintained
?Neubacher
that "there are no international
legal obstacles
question.

At about

the same time, Neubacher
union. Disregarding

for an economic

to the customs

union."28 He greeted the plan, announced
on March 21,
"first
result"
ofthe
work
ofthe
1931, as the
practical
People's League,
it
succeed.29
When
and predicted with "complete
that
would
certainty"
the governments
of France and Czechoslovakia
attacked the project as a
threat to European
Neubacher
security,
by stressing that it
responded
but also encouraged
membership,
provided not only for Austro-German
of other states, especially the agrarian nations of east?
the participation
ern Europe; by easing the economic
plight of these countries, he argued,
contribute
to
would
it
actually
peace. During the summer the People's
26.
27.
28.
29.

Neubacher, "Die Organisationen," p. 617.
See, for example, the New York Times, July 25, 1928, p. 4.
Der Anschluss,July 22, 1930, p. 1; Sept. 30, 1930, p. 1.
Der Anschluss, Mar. 28, 1931, p. 1; Nov. 29, 1930, p. 1.

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Wed, 29 Oct 2014 13:36:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

and the Austrian

Neubacher

358

Anschluss

Movement

its propaganda,
lectures and rallies in
sponsoring
every part of Austria.
On May 11, two months after the customs union debate began, the
intensified

League

Creditanstalt collapsed and central Europe was plunged into the
wTho was later appointed to a three-man
depression. Neubacher,
commission
to study the bank's failure, was closely attuned to the finan?
cial problems ofthe state, which seemed to confirm what he had always
Austrian

world

viable. For
Austria was economically
independent
Anschluss had always been a question of survival; the failure
Neubacher,
ofthe Creditanstalt, coming precisely at the time ofthe customs union

maintained?that

added a new element of urgency to his thinking and transcontroversy,
formed the unionist cause into a real life-and-death
struggle.
The rejection of the customs union project by the Hague Court in
September was a crucial turning point in the history ofthe Austrian An?
The negative ruling had a sobering effect on all sup?
schluss movement.
who had assured his
porters of Anschluss, and especially on Neubacher,
the summer that the verdict would be favorable.
readers throughout
before the impact of the court's decision could dissipate,
Moreover,
reverse which contributed
Neubacher's
career suffered an unexpected
to reevaluate the entire question of Anschluss strategy: in
Count Clauzel, the French ambassador, intervened with
1932
February
the Austrian government
and blocked Neubacher's
attempt to become

to his decision

a member

ofthe

reformed

executive

ofthe

Creditanstalt.30

In March, Neubacher
published a pamphlet which revealed the ex?
tent of his personal bitterness and reflected a shift in his thinking about
Anschluss.

Entitled

cise in geopolitics
ural relationship"

Der Kampf um Mitteleuropa,31 the tract was an exerwhich purported to offer statistical proof ofthe "nat?
between Germany, Austria, and the other Habsburg

is less arresting than its tone,
states. Its argument,
however,
is impatient and aggressively
nationalistic.
Previously Neubacher
had reserved his invectives for France and Czechoslovakia;
now he desuccession
which

nounced

well, condemning
the failure ofthe
of Nations"
would

of Nations and the system of international
law as
In light of
them as mere tools of French diplomacy.
customs union project he concluded
that the "League

the League

was a senseless

soon fossilize

Anger

contradiction

in terms and predicted

that it

and die.

and frustration

were further compounded

by the desperate

30. NA, Rieth to Ritter, Feb. 22, 1932, T-120/5195/K467397-400.
31. Vienna, 1932.
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the country's

economy.
secured an
1932, immediately
Austria in turn
loan of 300 million schillings, committing
Neubacher
this
to the Protocol
of Lausanne.
interpreted
agreement,
who

Dollfuss,
international

became

government
chancellor

which

experiments
prohibited
of international
an instrument

in May

in Austro-German

union until 1952, as
this
time
he was convinced
By
union could not be solved through

blackmail.

that the problem of Austro-German
credit and commissions
of the
international
agreement.32
"Foreign
he
Nations
save
had
in
of
cannot
written
the
us,"
already
League
previ?
"The road to freedom will only be won through the
ous September.
most earnest efforts of national self-help."33
This

appeal to "self-help"
was
bacher
shifting from the
two months later,
movement;
rumored
efforts ofthe
praised

was the first public indication
that Neu?
center to the right wing of the Anschluss
in November,
this became clear when he
Austrian

National
Socialist Party and the
of
the
Heimwehr move?
Styrian Heimatschutz,
right-wing
ment distinguished
by its support for German union, to draft a common
Such statements
also presaged the decline of
for
Anschluss.34
program
an offshoot

the People's League as an organ of mass opinion. Its coffers depleted by
the organization
the recent propaganda
was on the brink of
campaign,
financial collapse. Its doctrines were bankrupt as well, for the philosophy
and international
of nonpartisan
conciliation
had led to a
cooperation
it survived in name until 1938, the People's League
dead end. Although
was killed by the Hague ruling of 1931.35
Neubacher's
Styrian

initial foray into partisan politics was as a member ofthe
As a member of several nationalist fraternities, he

Heimatschutz.

32. ASW, Neubacher-Blaschke, no. 11/3, May 11, 1938.
33. Der Anschluss, Sept. 21, 1931, p. 1; July 23, 1932, p. 1.
34. Der Anschluss, Nov. 12, 1931, p. 1.
35. In October 1933, the Social Democratic Party officially struck Anschluss from its
program and withdrew its representatives from the executive of the People's League.
During the next two years Neubacher's organization was watched by the police and
meetings were sometimes cancelled. Following his arrest in June 1935 (see below) Neu?
bacher resigned as president ofthe People's League. It remained dormant until June 1937,
when Seyss-Inquart revived it as a forum for academic opponents of the Schuschnigg
regime such as Srbik, Nadler, Menghin, and Eibl. The last meeting was held in Vienna on
May 11, 1938. ASW, Neubacher-Blaschke, no. 11/3, May 11, 1938; Nuernberg, Mili?
tary Tribunals, Trials of War Criminals beforethe NuernbergMilitary TribunalsunderCon?
trol Council Law No. 10, 15 vols. (Washington, D.C, 1949-53) (hereafter NMT), 12:
694, memorandum of Captain Leopold, Aug. 7, 1937, doc. 3282-NG; ZAS, vol. 118:
Freie Stimmen (Klagenfurt), June 26 and 29, 1937; Rosar, Deutsche Gemeinschaft,p. 158;
FrankfurterZeitung, May 4, 1938 (Reich ed.), p. 2.
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was well

with most of the Heimwehr leaders, but he had
acquainted
and emphasis on direct
hitherto rejected their militant anti-Marxism
action.36 In late 1932, however,
both he and Seyss-Inquart joined the
group.37 The Heimatschutz was only one branch of the fragHeimwehr and offered scant promise of ever becoming a base for
the mass movement
had sought to build since 1925. Never?
Neubacher
Styrian
mented

theless, it was through
Socialist
the National

the Heimatschutz
Because

that he forged his first links with
Anschluss was a basic part of the

Party.
the activities of the NSDAP
had followed
Neubacher
program,
that he regarded Na?
for some time;38 there is no indication, however,
tional Socialism seriously before 1931. The Austrian Nazi Party, with
only a few thousand members in the late 1920s, was not even repre?
Nazi

ofthe People's League. But the People's League
the
customs union and Creditanstalt crises, while
during
Hitler's party grew rapidly in Germany and made startling gains in the
Austrian provincial elections of April 1932. Considering
political devel?
sented on the executive
was ineffectual

it seemed reasonable to expect that the next na?
make the Nazi Party a force in the Austrian par?
now became
the NSDAP
as for Seyss-Inquart,
liament. For Neubacher,
the Nazi "seithe logical vehicle for Anschluss. In April 1933, following
opments in Germany,
tional elections would

Styrian Heimatschutz and the
Adolf Hitler
an alliance which recognized
nation." Shortly thereafter an article appeared

zure of power" in Germany,
Austrian NSDAP
concluded
as ''Fiihrer ofthe

German

leaders ofthe

in Der Panther, the organ ofthe Styrian Heimatschutz, describing Neu?
bacher as a man "who enjoys the trust of all greater German circles in
Austria and the Reich."
in the activities

Henceforth

of the Austrian

Neubacher

was intimately

involved

Nazi movement.39

36. Der Anschluss,Aug. 15, 1927, p. 1; Sept. 21, 1929, p. 2; Oct. 31, 1929, p. 1.
37. In light of Neubacher's remarks of May 11, 1938, in which he emphasized the
importance ofthe LausanneProtocol (July 1932) in reshaping his attitudes, it seems likely
that he joined the Heimatschutzin the summer or autumn of 1932. Seyss-Inquart testifled
at Nuremberg that he (Seyss) joined the organization in the autumn. ASW, NeubacherBlaschke, no. 11/3, May 11, 1938; IMT, 16: 81.
38. U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy
and Aggression,10 vols. (Washington, D.C, 1946-48) (hereafter NCA), 2: 958, SeyssInquart to Himmler, Aug. 19, 1939, doc. 3271-PS.
39. ZAS, vol. 118: DerPanther (Graz), Apr. 29,1933; Rosar, DeutscheGemeinschaft,pp.
59-60. Neubacher did not officially receive a party number until May 1938. On relations
between the Styrian Heimatschutzand the NSDAP see Bruce Frederick Pauley, HahnenNationalsozialismus
schwanz und Hakenkreuz: SteirischerHeimatschutzund osterreichischer
1918-1934 (Vienna, 1972).
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As president
of the People's
of the
conscious
Neubacher,
League,
need to appeal to the widest possible audience, had never precisely deform which Anschluss should assume. As a parfined the constitutional
it became clear that his idea of
however,
ticipant in the Nazi movement,
was based on the idea of "home rule." Im?
Austrian self-determination
himself with the opponents
of Theo Habicht,
he identified
mediately
Hitler had named "Landesinspekteur"
for
the German citizen whom
in 1931. The leader of this opposition
faction was Anton Reinthaller, who broke with Habicht in the spring of 1933 over the issue of
of the Anschluss
favored a negotiated
settlement
terrorism. Reinthaller
to one of his followers,
stood for a synthesis of
question and, according
and the "greater national idea," hoping
Austrian "state consciousness"
to transform
into a national front composed
of the Panthe NSDAP
Austria

groups, the Heimwehr, and the nationalist wing ofthe Christian
Social movement.40
Under his leadership the so-called "national oppo?
sition" to Dollfuss developed.
German

It is a mark ofthe

iden?
fluidity of Austrian politics that Neubacher's
with an attempt by Doll?
tification with Reinthaller's
group coincided
contacts with the
fuss to draw him into the government.
Neubacher's
made
Socialists, the Heimatschutz, and the moderate wing ofthe NSDAP
him a potentially
valuable ally for the government,
especially in Vienna,
In April
where he was associated with the popular housing program.
Dollfuss
offered
Neubacher
the
of
of state
1933
undersecretary
position
for labor. The chancellor's
of
the
Laupolicies, however?negotiation
in March
and subsequently
his suspension of parliament
a
men.
breach
between
the
two
Neubacher
refused
1933?had
opened
declared himself a member of
the post and at the same time, publicly
the national opposition.41
sanne Protocol,

This
attempts
National
walked
nearly

incident

was

one

of the first in a series

of well-documented

of
with representatives
by Dollfuss to reach an understanding
For over a year he
Socialism
and the Anschluss movement.
a diplomatic
tightrope,
as much as the Austrian

of Mussolini
fearing the "protection"
Nazis and domination
by Berlin. Al?
Habicht were fruitless and led to the ban-

though attempts to deal with
ning of the Nazi Party in June,

Dollfuss

kept

the back

door

open

to

40. Franz Langoth, Kampf um Osterreich:Erinnerungeneines Politikers (Wels, Austria,
1951), pp. 209, 383-84.
41. ZAS, vol. 118: (title missing), Apr. 23, 1933; Caroline Neubacher to the author,
Vienna, Nov. 6,1971.
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other than
opposition,
hoping to find someone
to negotiate.
In the late spring of 1934, shortly
before he was murdered, Dollfuss entertained a proposal, sponsored by
to circumvent
Habicht and deal with the higher leadership
Neubacher,
in Berlin.42
ofthe NSDAP
Habicht

national

with

whom

Neubacher's
he discussed with Dollfuss in late May
strategy?which
or early June43?was
to
designed
capitalize on tensions within the Aus?
and to take advantage of recent international
trian Nazi movement
de?
Like
almost
of
Austrian
the
NSDAP
suf?
life,
every aspect
velopments.
fered from acute factionalism;
divided by a struggle between

since mid-1933
the movement
had been
Habicht (supported by a small SS organi?
zation) and the SA, led in Austria by Hermann Reschny. As early as
November
1933, Ernst Rohm, chief ofthe SA, began to take a personal
the civil war in Feb?
interest in the rivalry, which intensified following
contacts at the German embassy, Neubacher
ruary 1934.44 Through
knew that Habicht's credit in Berlin had begun to decline after February
and that, in deference to Mussolini, Hitler was adopting a more flexible
Austrian policy, based on a gradual settlement ofthe Anschluss question.
At the same
promising,

time, prospects
since the Austrian

for an agreement
with Dollfuss seemed
chancellor was himself involved in a des-

Starperate struggle with the Heimwehr members of his cabinet?Prince
win the support of nationalist forces.
hemberg and Emil Fey?to
In their meeting
discussed the possibility
Dollfuss
and Neubacher
in Austria (presumably
of the latter's becoming
leader of the NSDAP
through Rohm's influence), and Dollfuss promised the national opposi?
tion four cabinet posts if Neubacher
replaced Habicht. UnawTare that
Neu?
stock was declining even more rapidly than Habicht's,
bacher carried his plan to the very top ofthe Nazi hierarchy, securing an
to discuss his
audience with the Fiihrer himself. When he attempted

Rohm's

42. Dieter Ross, Hitler und Dollfuss: Die deutscheOsterreich-Politik1933-1934 (Ham?
burg, 1966); Jurgen Gehl, Austria, Germanyand the Anschluss,1931-1938 (London, 1963),
pp. 45-87.
43. U.S. Department of State, Documentson GermanForeignPolicy, 1918-1945. 13 vols.
(Washington, D.C, 1957-64), series C (1933-36) (hereafter DGFP), 3: 47, Habicht to
Hiiffer, June 18,1934, doc. 17. This report is the only record ofthe Neubacher plan. Ross
believes that it was written by Otto Wachter (an agent of Habicht) shortly before Hit?
ler's meeting with Mussolini in Venice on June 14-15, and that it was instrumental in
Habicht's final decision to launch a putsch in July. Ross, Hitler and Dollfuss, p. 229.
44. Helmuth Auerbach, "Eine nationalsozialistische Stimme zum Wiener Putsch vom
25. July 1934," Vierteljahrshefte
fiir Zeitgeschichte12 (Jan. 1964): 201-18; Ross, Hitler und
Dollfuss, pp. 113-17, 184, 214.
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Hitler avoided the issue and asked him not to talk
project, however,
of Hitler's support, warned
about Austria at all. Habicht, still confident
to visit Rohm while he was in
Neubacher
not to accept an invitation
Germany.45
The purge

on June 20 brought the project to a sudden halt,
and Neubacher
was fortunate
that his career in Nazi politics was not
ended by his association
with the SA leader. His future would almost
certainly have been darker had it not been for the fact that, less than a
of Rohm, Theo Habicht was himself recalled
month after the liquidation
of Rohm

by an enraged Hitler for having planned the putsch of July 25 in which
was arrested by the Austrian police and
Dollfuss was killed. Neubacher
in the putsch, but he was soon
held briefly on suspicion of complicity
for lack of evidence.
his precise relationship
to the
Although
of July 25 remains unclear,46 a persuasive
reason for believing
that he was not actually involved
is the fact that the attempted coup was
carried out by members
of the Austrian SS Standarte 89. It is unlikely

released
events

that Neubacher's
the putsch?and
welcome
among

close

ties with

the SA?which

his long hostility
the conspirators,

to Habicht
even

did not participate
in
have made him

would

had he wanted

to become

in?

volved.
The putsch altered the situation in Austria. Hitler,
ciate himself from the affair, made it clear that?for
was to be no direct contact
in Austria.47

between

the Reich

anxious

to disasso-

the present?there
and the Nazi movement

This gave the national opposition
leaders what appeared to
to shape the movement
without interference
from the

be a new chance
north,
July

albeit in even less favorable

circumstances

than had existed

before

25.

45. DGFP, 3: 47, Habicht to Hiiffer, June 18,1934, doc. 17; cf. Gehl, Austria, Germany
and the Anschlsss, p. 94; Ross, Hitler und Dollfuss, p. 299.
46. Otto Wachter and Rudolf Weydenhammer, two ofthe leading conspirators, later
wrote accounts ofthe putsch. Neither mentioned Neubacher in connection with the plot,
although Weydenhammer stated that he talked briefly with Neubacher in the vicinity of
the Ballhausplatz on the afternoon of July 25, while members ofthe SS Standarte89 were
occupying the chancellery. Rudolf Weydenhammer, "Bericht iiber die Erhebung der
Nationalsozialisten am 25. Juli 1934 in Wien," NSDAP Hauptarchiv, The Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, reel 33, folder 634, frames 2i2ff. (written
shortly after the Anschlussin 1938); Auerbach, "Eine nationalsozialistische Stimme," pp.
204-5; Rosar, Deutsche Gemeinschaft,pp. 74-75.
47. According to Hitler's deputy, Hess, "The Austrian NSDAP must decide where and
in what form they will build a new party by themselves.17DGFP, 3: 352-53, Hess to
Frauenfeld, Aug. 21, 1934, doc. 173.
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the new chancellor, was less flexible than the
Although
Schuschnigg,
the Reinthaller group
certain
of
his
actions encouraged
agile Dollfuss,
Chief among these was Schuschto renew contacts with the government.
of
of
the
activities
the
toleration
Circle," a group
"Langoth
nigg's
by Franz Langoth after the July putsch to assist the families of
imprisoned and exiled Nazis. It was also well known that, like Dollfuss,
distrusted Mussolini and the influence he exercised through
Schuschnigg

formed

the Heimwehr
Reinthaller

of the government.
Under these circumstances
with the
a fresh effort to reach an accommodation

members

launched

the task of reorganizhe assigned Neubacher
Meanwhile,
government.
Nazi
the
ing
illegal
party.48
The July putsch had thrown the party into chaos, and Neubacher
to bring it under the control ofthe Rein?
sought to use the opportunity
His major difficulty, aside from keeping his activities
from the authorities, was winning the acceptance ofthe militant
for advocating
older members of the party who opposed Reinthaller
The subsequent failure ofthe "Rein?
with the government.
compromise
thaller

faction.

hidden

thaller Action,"
between

which

Schuschnigg,

culminated
Starhemberg,

in an unsuccessful
and a delegation
forced Reinthaller

October

meeting
of the national

to renounce his
(including Neubacher),49
opposition
who assumed the task
claim to party leadership in favor of Neubacher,
of keeping the moderate position alive. A struggle for leadership ofthe
party ensued, the national opposition grouping itself around Neubacher,
the older members rallying behind Joseph Leopold, a senior party mem?
Austria. Leopold consistently opposed the evolutionary
and their successor, SeyssNeubacher,
by Reinthaller,
strategy
Inquart; reluctant to adapt his own ideas to the shifting policies of Ber?
lin, he ultimately became a black sheep in the party and was ordered out
ber from Lower

favored

of Austria by Hitler shortly before the Anschluss in 1938. He was a forand proved stronger than Neubacher,
nonetheless,
opponent,
who was handicapped
by his lack of seniority, his past association with
midable

48. NA, report by Prinz zu Erbach, "Bisherige Ergebnislosigkeit der Verstandigungsaktion Reinthaller," Oct. 18, 1934, T-77 (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW)
/900/5653797-805; NCA, 2: 962-63, Seyss-Inquart, "The Austrian Question, 19341938," Sept. 9, 1945, doc. 3254-PS; DGFP, 3: 334, memorandum by Huffer, Aug. 20,
1934, doc. 166.
49. NA, report by Prinz zu Erbach, Oct. 18, 1934, T-77/900/5653797-805; Ernst
Rudiger Starhemberg, Memoiren(Vienna, 1971), pp. 209-14. Secondary accounts ofthe
failure ofthe Reinthaller action are plentiful. See Gehl, Austria,Germanyandthe Anschluss,
p. 105.
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Austrian Marxism,
and his former connections
with the SA leadership
and the Styrian Heimatschutz.50 The struggle, which lasted well into the
spring of 1935, soon attracted a wider audience. As early as January 1935,
was the new Nazi leader, and
the press reported rumors that Neubacher
had been leaked by his enemies as a way
surmised that the information
of eliminating
him. In May a Vienna
chief ofthe illegal Nazis and Neubacher

as
named Leopold
newspaper
as the "grey eminence"
ofthe

On June 21 the police searched Neubacher's
residence and
which
enabled
them
documents
to
arrest
Neubacher,
office, uncovering
Leopold, and a number of others. Both men were tried for illegal politi?
movement.51

to periods of imprisonment.52
cal activity and sentenced
This arrest ended Neubacher's
political activity in Austria for a period
he was released after the Austro-German
of three years. Although
agree?
an amnesty for political pris?
ment of July 11, 1936 (which included
oners),

Neubacher

position
moderate

with

renounced

his claim

I. G. Farben in Berlin.

to party leadership and took a
In Austria the struggle between the

and radical wings ofthe Anschluss
ofa rivalry between
Seyss-Inquart

movement

was renewed

in

and Leopold
(also released
but
Neubacher
was
not
involved.
Be?
the
1936 amnesty),
directly
by
tween January 1937 and March 1938 he worked for Farben as a specialaffairs of Austria and southeastern
ist in the economic
Europe and traveled widely in the Balkans, where he gained experience
which qualithe form

War II. He
for diplomatic
posts in the area during World
in
the
to
Anschluss
in 193 8.53
no
role
events
immediately
leading
played
in the Anschluss move?
involvement
The final chapter in Neubacher's
fied him

mayor of Vi?
began on March 13, 1938, when he was appointed
The
enna under Austria's new chancellor,
Seyss-Inquart.
appointment
with Social Democracy
was tactical; Neubacher's
and
past association
ment

its popular housing program made him one of the few figures in Nazi
circles qualified to exploit working-class
hostility toward the Schusch50. IMT, 34: 1-11, speech by Rainer, Mar. 11, 1942, doc. 4005-PS; IMT, 26: 349-51,
report by Rainer, July 6, 1939, doc. 812-PS. The struggle was complicated by a rivalry
between "old fighters" ofthe NSDAP and men who had entered the movement via the
Heimatschutz,who were never completely accepted.
51. ZAS, vol. 118: Telegraf am Mittag (Vienna), Jan. 15, 1935, and Der Osterreicher
(Vienna), May 3, 1935.
52. IMT, 34: 1-11, speech by Rainer, Mar. 11, 1942, doc. 4405-PS; IMT, 26: 349-51,
report by Rainer, July 6, 1939, doc. 812-PS; Langoth, Kampf um Osterreich,p. 202.
53. NMT, 7:1397-98, extracts from the minutes of Farben's Commercial Committee,
Mar. 23,1938, doc. 9289-NI; private interview with Caroline Neubacher, Vienna, Aug.
20, 1972; Rosar, Deutsche Gemeinschaft,p. 264.

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Wed, 29 Oct 2014 13:36:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

366

Neubacher

and the Austrian

Anschluss

Movement

nigg regime and to prepare the city for the plebiscite of April 10 on the
question of union. To this end he revived the idea that the NSDAP was
a social revolutionary
party, pledging the Vienna workers a "socialism
ofthe deed" and promising an end to unemployment
by the end ofthe
year.54
Immediately,
vists dismissed

began a program to reinstate Socialist actigovernment
municipal jobs by the Schuschnigg
speeches, tried to win the support of former Schutz-

Neubacher
from

and, in numerous
bund members,
basing his appeal
Nazis had waged a revolutionary

on the idea that both

Socialists

the clerical

and

dictator?

struggle against
he
Socialism as an alternative to capitalism,
National
ship. Depicting
of
Nazi
eco?
as
essential
rationalization
and
aspects
emphasized
planning
nomic policy. 55 On March 31 he unveiled plans for a housing program
modeled on that ofthe Social Democrats,
and public housing became a
major theme of his speeches for several months. During the summer he
proposals for public works in Vienna to create
and
employment
prepare Vienna for a new role as the Third Reich's
gateway to southeastern
Europe.56
also outlined

ambitious

since, next to
sincerity in these matters is indisputable
reform. Inihis
been
concern
had
Anschluss,
municipal
always
major
in
he
to
seems
have
been
successful
tially,
fairly
rallying support for the
in April the Times correspondent
NSDAP;
reported that "Of all the
Neubacher's

of Vienna, has prob?
local Nazis, Dr. Neubacher,
the new Burgomaster
in
done
the
the working class,
most
to
conciliate
those, especially
ably
who do not have Nazi convictions."57
reform was
Since municipal
a genuine priority of the higher officials of the Reich, however,
Neubacher's
housing and public-works
programs, which would have
off
the ground. Over a year after
taken decades to complete, hardly got
never

54- ASW, Neubacher-Blaschke, no. 11/1, Apr. 25, 1938. An illustrated booklet, Die
nationalsozialistischeRevolutionin Wien: Bildberichtiiberdie Wiener Ereignissevom 11 Marz
bis 10 April 1938 (Vienna, 1938), conveys the spirit ofthe propaganda campaign; Neu?
bacher wrote the introduction.
55. Wiener Zeitung, Apr. 1, 1938, p. 4, and Apr. 8, 1938, p. 7; ASW, NeubacherBlaschke, no. 18/7, Oct. 10, 1938.
56. WienerZeitung, Apr. 1, 1938, p. 10; Neue Freie Presse,Aug. 1, 1938 (Monday ed.),
p. 3; FrankfurterZeitung, Dec. 9, 1938 (Reich ed.), Southeast Europe supplement, p. 9;
ASW, Neubacher-Blaschke, no. 12/6, July 16, 1938. Friedrich Heer, Der Glaube des
Adolf Hitler: AnatomieeinerpolitischenReligiositdt(Munich, 1968), p. 416, describes Neu?
bacher's interest in southeastern Europe as representative ofa "k.-k.-6sterreichisch-ostmarkischer Nationalsozialismus."
57. The Times (London), Apr. 2, 1938, p. 11.
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the Anschluss, the housing situation in Vienna was still described
was forced to qualify his earlier promises.
cal, and Neubacher
the plebiscite of April 10, Neubacher's
Following
prominence

as criti?
58
in Aus?

like that of many other former leaders of the na?
tional opposition,
in
Inevitably he became involved
rapidly diminished.
friend Seyss-Inquart
the power struggle between
his longtime
and Jo?
who came to Vienna to act as "coordinaseph Biirckel, the Rhinelander
tria's "new

order,"

tor" of Gleichschaltung with the Reich. Biirckel, who surrounded
him?
as
associates from the Rhineland,
the
quickly replaced Seyss
man in Austria. In June 1938 rumors circulated
most important
that
and
to
Hitler
Neubacher
had
submitted
at
BerchtesSeyss
grievances

self with

only to be rudely rebuffed.59 Seyss was quickly
of Austrian affairs, and eventually
excluded
periphery

pushed

to the

entirely.

Neu?

gaden,

bacher

suffered

a similar

pare a case against
shevik" sympathies

fate: in late 1938 Biirckel's staff began
mayor. The question of Neubacher's

the new

to pre?
"bol?

was revived, and he was also accused of association
with the "most vile" Jewish circles. On the basis of these charges Biirckel
in February
the city government
himself
1939, naming
reorganized
"Gauleiter"

the municipal
government,
tive."60 As the year wore
diminish,

of Vienna; Neubacher
remained in
but only as Biirckel's
"general representa?
on and Neubacher's
continued
to
authority

and "Reichstatthalter"

it became

clear that he had no future

in Vienna; when the
a "temporary"
position as eco?
in Rumania,
where he helped
of May 1940. He was still formally

opportunity
presented itself he accepted
nomic advisor to the German embassy
the Oil-Arms
negotiate
Agreement
a member of the Viennese government

and, for a time, tried to main?
tain contact with Vienna from his post in Bucharest.
He soon realized
the futility of his efforts, however,
after
a
new
arpersonality
especially
58. FrankfurterZeitung, Apr. 9,1939 (Reich ed.), p. 5; ASW, Neubacher-Blaschke, no.
97>July 8, 1939. More important than new construction in dealing with the problem of
working-class housing was the requisitioning of Jewish apartments, an aspect of the offi?
cial anti-Semitism introduced by the NSDAP. Neubacher endorsed requisitioning but
opposed the violent outbursts of popular anti-Semitism which followed the Anschluss.
Neue Freie Presse, Mar. 17, 1938 (evening ed.), p. 1; Deutsch, Ein Weiter Weg, p. 158.
59. Arnold J. Toynbee and V. M. Boulter, eds., Survey of InternationalAffairs: 1938
(London, 1941), pp. 257-58.
60. NA, Burckel to Goring, Oct. 15, 1938, T-84 (Miscellaneous German Records)
/13/10360; NA, Burckel to Goring, Oct. 27,1938, T-84/13/10362-64; NA, Records of
the Reichkommissar fiir die Wiedervereinigung Osterreichs mit dem deutschen Reich,
T-84/13/10368-72; IMT, 11: 434; FrankfurterZeitung, Apr. 22, 1939 (Reich ed.), p. 2,
and May 5, 1939 (Reich ed.), p. 10.
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rived on the scene in the Austrian

capital, one with even more influence
Baldur von Schirach. Schirach,
leader,
youth
who was appointed Gauleiter of Vienna by Hitler in the summer of 1940,
was given access to the file concerning
Neubacher's
past and warned by
Burckel that Neubacher
wanted to become
The
"king of Vienna."
than Burckel:

the Nazi

affair dissipated as the war progressed and Neubacher's
"tempo?
with the foreign ministry became permanent.61
rary" appointment
Neubacher's
early career, no less than that of his friend Seyss-Inquart,

whole

mirrors

the difficulties

which

beset interwar

Austria.

Political

life in the

was a peculiar blend of lofty idealism and petty intrigue.
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion?shared
by many
Austrian politics were absurdly parochial,
at the time?that

first republic
In retrospect
Austrians

so fiercely were too grand for the forum, that
the "great social, cultural, and economic
questions, the ones that affect
could never be resolved within the confines of the tiny
the world,"
the tumult was one inescapable fact: regardless of
state.62 Underlying
that the issues debated

ideological
persuasion (or lack thereof) the majority of Austrians simply
refused to accept the idea that they were no longer the ruling nationality
ofa great empire, that they were no longer a "historic people." No one
expressed this feeling more clearly than Ignaz Seipel, twice chancellor of
the republic, when he called the Austrians a "big-state people" with a
mission yet to perform in the world.63 In the minds of most Austrians,
mission would be fiilfilled within the context of some
that ill-defined
form

of union

with

Germany.
in Vienna?Hermann
For many people?particularly
the
Neubacher,
in
the
a
career
became
late
of
bureaucrat,
1920s
symbol
impartial
oppo?
untenable situation. His Austro-German
sition to Austria's seemingly
People's League, more effectively
lated popular resentment
toward
which

forced

far below

Austria

her historical

than any other organization,
articuan ethically indefensible
peace, one

to "accommodate
and national

herself
level"

to artificial

and transformed

boundaries
her into a

pool . . . separated from the great living current of world
From his own point of view, Neubacher
acted as a patriot,
one who avoided the nostalgia of monarchism
while working to recap"stagnant
events."64

6i. NA, Neubacher to Wiehl, Apr. 17,1940, T-120/1170/471746; ASW, NeubacherBlaschke, no. 119, Mar. 9, 1940.
62. Der Anschluss,May 16, 1929, p. 1.
63. Sweet, "Seipel's Views," p. 323.
64. Der Anschluss, Oct. 31, 1929, p. 2.
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the greatness she had once enjoyed as the heart ofa cosof 1931-32 destroyed
empire. The decisions and agreements
mopolitan
Socialism in Ger?
the work he had begun, and the triumphs of National
ture for Austria

many and Austria
those who became

him with

confronted
leaders ofthe

a critical

"national

choice.

Like many of
Neubacher
was

opposition,"
opposed the use of force and favored
solutions to problems; but his uncompromis"legal" (i.e., bureaucratic)
will
for
Anschluss
made
him a potential ally of radicalism and, in the
ing
himself
at
he
the
end,
disposal of ultranationalism.65
placed
Neubacher
had always supported Anschluss in the name of self-deter?
a moderate

by temperament

mination,
Austrian

and he continued

autonomy
Third Reich. These

would

who

that
to do so after 1933 in the expectation
of the
within the framework

be honored

hopes and, since 1938, they have been
naivete of Hitler's moderate support?
since the
are not entirely justified, however,

were illusory
cited as evidence ofthe

regularly
ers in Austria.

Such charges
of "Anschluss"
meaning

firmly established
prior to
the
1938, either in Austria or in Berlin. Under the circumstances,
idea that Austria might enjoy special status within a greater Germany
did not necessarily
seem in valid; indeed, it appears that only after his
enthusiastic reception in Linz on March 12 did the Fiihrer himself decide
precise
March

was never

against a personal union ofthe two countries
of Austria.66 Once that decision was made,

in favor of total absorption
Gleichschaltung became the

to the history of the Austrian Anschluss movement.
and Hitler's other
however,
by dismissing Neubacher
or
as
leaders ofa
as
naive
moderate
"crypto-Nazi"
dupes,
supporters
"fifth column";
the history of interwar Austria has been too long obThe "Anschluss men"
and emotionalism.
scured by oversimplification
sobering epilogue
Little is gained,

were essentially motivated
by the desire to see Austrians determine
own fate; the irony is that in pursuing this goal so singlemindedly
of their dream.
to the destruction
contributed
unconsciously

65. See the comments of Alexander Bernhard Spitzmuller-Harmersbach,
hat auch Ursach, es zu Liebeniy (Vienna, 1955), pp. 396-97.
66. Gehl, Austria, Germany and the Anschluss, pp. 194-95.
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